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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK GRANATO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14425

v.
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
GRAND JURY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

WAHLQUIST, District Judge
The appellant was the Chairman of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission.

The Salt Lake County Grand Jury

indicted him on two counts of requesting bribes and two counts
of receiving bribes, all allegedly to affect zoning matters.
He was taken into custody, on the warrants, and released on
his own promise to appear.
The complete criminal file is not before this court,
but the briefs of the parties concede that the District Court
conducting the criminal proceeding refused to review the verbatim transcript of the witnesses on which the Grand Jury
apparently relied upon in returning the indictment.

In effect

he has refused to review the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the indictment.

The criminal court also refused to
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-2order a preliminary hearing.

The same court apparently

disappointed the appellant herein by limiting the bill of
particulars and the appellantfs right to discovery.

The

judge cited State v. Faux, a 1959 case (9 Utah 2d 350, 345
Pacific 2d 186) and permitted the defense counsel to examine
the testimony of witnesses on the indictment, but prohibited
the copying of the testimony and denied other requests.
The appellant immediately filed this civil complaint in the
nature of a writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his
freedom is constructively restrained by the defendants because:
M

l. The indictment in Criminal No.
28220 against the appellant was issued
without sufficient probable cause.
n

2 . The appellant was denied verbatim
copies of transcripts of testimony of any
and all witnesses who appeared before the
grand jury relative to the indictment.
11

3. The appellant was denied the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of all persons interviewed by the grand
jury to determine both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.
"4. The appellant was denied taking
depositions of all persons deemed necessary
for adequate preparation of his defense to
the indictment.
f,

5. The appellant was denied a preliminary examination before trial on the
indictment.11
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-3The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint.
They assert that it does not state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted*

The District Court (the same

judge hearing the criminal matter) granted the motion to
dismiss, but then apparently made an order in the criminal
case suspending the proceedings until the appeal from his
order in the civil matter was decided.
The named defendants in this civil proceeding are:
first the 1975 Salt Lake County Grand Jury, second the Foreman
thereof and the individual members, third some John Does 1
through 10 who have never been served or appeared.
The individual grand jurors, either individually or
as a group, had no right nor power to make any disclosure of
the testimony before it without a court order.

Grand jury

members as such have no power or obligation to account to
individuals indicted for the logic of their action. The
grand jurors have no power to either grant or free this appellant from the constructive restraints present on him.

It is

abundantly clear that the defendants herein named, either

1. Utah Code Annotated § 77-19-10 and § 77-19-9 (1953),
as amended.
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-4individually or as a ffGrand Jury11, are without the power
to grant any of the relief here prayed for without an express
court order; and no such express court order is alleged/

The

District Court therefore was justified in dismissing the
complaint.
There is another compelling reason that the dismissal of the complaint was proper.

Setting aside the obvious

fact that the named defendants were powerless to grant the
relief requested and assuming that a party witlj such power
had been named a defendant, then the issue appears "Should
the writ of habeas corpus have been granted?" The Court
holds that it should not.
This Court has held many times that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus cannot be used in effect as
a substitute for the orderly processes of appeal.2 What is
requested in this case is in effect an intermediate appeal.
If this writ were granted, it would have the effect of
placing the criminal division of the District Court under
the supervision of the civil division of the District Court
via the surreptitious route of writ of habeas corpus. The

2.

Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121.
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development of such a procedure would be highly undesirable.
This proceeding has in effect caused the delay of the criminal
proceeding for over six months.

If the Supreme Court deemed

this a proper case to hear an intermediate appeal, it could
3
grant such an appeal; but to permit such a power to rest in
the civil division of the District Court would cause an
unnecessary complication in the process of criminal proceedings.

The District Court was therefor justified in

dismissing this application for release as an improper effort
to substitute the extraordinary writ for the intermediate
appeal.
In order for this Court to reach the issues requested
to be determined by the appellant herein, the Court would not
only have to ignore the obvious error in the naming of defendants, but would also have to ignore the unjustified attempt
to develop a new form of intermediate appeal and then proceed
to meet the purported issues head on.
do so in this case.

The Court refuses to

Insofar as the civil complaint is a

justification for the delay of the criminal proceedings, it
no longer exists.

3. Rule 72 (b) URCP.
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-6The order dismissing the complaint is affirmed•
The individual members of the grand jury named as defendants
are awarded their costs, if any, herein.
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